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Title: The I in Autism: Severity and social functioning in Autism is related to 
self-processing bias 
 
Abstract 
It is well established that children with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) show 
impaired understanding of others and deficits within social functioning.  However, it 
is still unknown whether self-processing is related to these impairments and to what 
extent self impacts social functioning and communication. Using an ownership 
paradigm, we show that children with ASD and chronological- and verbal-age-
matched typically developing (TD) children do show the self referential effect in 
memory. In addition, the self bias was dependent on symptom severity and socio-
communicative ability. Children with milder ASD symptoms were more likely to 
have a high self-bias, consistent with a low attention to others relative to self. In 
contrast, severe ASD symptoms were associated with reduced self-bias, consistent 
with an ‘absent self’ hypothesis. These findings indicate that deficits in self-
processing may be related to impairments in social cognition for those on the lower 
end of the autism spectrum.   
Keywords 
Self; Ownership; Autism; ASD; Individual Differences 
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1. Introduction 
Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) is a developmental disorder diagnosed by a 
cluster of symptoms and behaviors within two criterion domains: social 
communication and restricted or repetitive behaviors (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013).  Impairments in the two diagnostic domains manifest in varying 
degrees and are dependent on developmental age and ability, resulting in a 
heterogeneous group (Frith, 2003). A central feature of ASD is a social processing 
difficulty that impacts on reciprocal communication, understanding, and behavior 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013). To date, research into social processing 
has largely focused on how individuals with ASD process information about other 
people (e.g., theory of mind, emotion recognition, the empathizing-systemizing 
balance, Baron-Cohen, et al., 1999; Leekam & Perner, 1991; Philip et al., 2010). 
However, a growing body of research speaks to a second critical area of social 
cognition: self-processing. 
It has been argued that the self is at the heart of social cognition, with an 
understanding of self as a basis for the understanding of other people (i.e., simulation 
theory; see Goldman, 2006). Following this logic, an impaired self-concept may be 
anchored within some of the socio-communicative impairments in ASD (Frith, 2003; 
Frith & Happe, 1999; Lombardo, Barnes, Wheelwright, & Baron-Cohen, 2007; 
Mundy, 2003). Indeed, the term ‘autism’ is derived from the Greek word for self, 
reflecting the egocentricity historically associated with ASD (Asperger, 1944). While 
this egocentrism may actually arise as a by-product of inattention to other people (see 
Hobson, 1984), there is some research suggesting that self-processing itself is atypical 
in ASD, leading to the ‘absent-self’ hypothesis (Frith & Happé, 1999; Frith, 2003). 
For example, individuals with ASD display less self-conscious emotion (Kasari, 
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Sigman, Baumgartner, & Stipek, 2006; Heerey, Keltner, & Capps, 2003), show a 
reduction in autobiographical memory (relative to semantic memory – Crane & 
Goddard, 2008; Millward Powell, Messer, & Jordon, 2000), and have atypical neural 
responses to self-referent stimuli (e.g., failing to show the ventromedial prefrontal 
activation that distinguishes self from other in neurotypical adults – Lombardo, 
Chakrabarti, Bullmore, Sadek, Pasco, et al., 2010). A deficit in self-processing may 
therefore be a causal part of the social difficulties associated with ASD, so it is 
important to have a detailed understanding of how self-development in children with 
ASD may differ from that of typically developing children. 
Interestingly, the early development of self-recognition progresses at a similar 
rate in children with ASD and those who are typically-developing, with both groups 
meeting the milestone of mirror self-recognition at around the chronological age of 18 
months (Dawson & McKissick 1984; Neuman & Hill 1978; Spiker & Ricks 1984). 
Intact self-recognition is further evidenced by reports of both typical neural activation 
on perception of self-images (Uddin et al., 2008), and typical attention allocation to 
self-images (Gillespie-Smith, Doherty-Sneddon, Hancock & Riby 2014). These 
patterns suggest that individuals with ASD do show physical self-recognition 
(Povinelli, 2001).  
In contrast, other developmental milestones of self-processing show 
differences between children with ASD and typically developing children. For 
example, children with ASD show reduced spontaneous personal pronoun use relative 
to other children of similar verbal abilities (Lee, Hobson, & Chiat, 1994), indicative 
of a difficulty in explicitly differentiating themselves from others (Lind & Bowler, 
2009). Neurological evidence suggests that a psychological self-concept is delayed or 
impaired in autism (Bird, et al. 2010; Fitzgerald, Angstadt, Jelsone, Nathan & Phan, 
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2006; Lombardo, Chakrabarti, Bullmore, Sadek, & Pasco, 2010; Silani, et al. 2008).  
Further to this, Lombardo et al. (2010) found that when participants were asked to 
mentalize about themselves or another person (the Queen); there were specific 
disruptions in adults with ASD within the neural networks involved in processing 
self-information. Specifically, changes (i.e. differences between baseline and activity) 
in the ventromedial prefrontal activation that typify self-referential cognition (Kelley, 
Macrae, Wyland, Caglar, Inati, & Heatherton, 2002; Moran, Macrae, Heatherton, 
Wyland & Kelley, 2006) were present in neurotypical participants but absent in those 
with ASD.  In addition, those with ASD also showed atypical middle cingulate 
activation in response to other-mentalizing (relative to self-mentalizing). This 
evidence suggests that while physical self-recognition is unimpaired in ASD, 
psychological self-processing is disrupted (Dunphy-Lelii & Wellman, 2012).  
The distinction between physical and psychological self-knowledge is 
important because it may explain an area of mixed findings regarding self-processing 
biases in autism research. The study of self-processing in neurotypical individuals has 
revealed that self-related material activates processing biases to a greater degree than 
non-self-related information. For example, information relating to the self 
automatically attracts attention, is perceived more quickly, increases physiological 
arousal, and results in rich, episodic encoding (Bargh, 1982; Conway & Dewhurst, 
1995; Klein & Loftus, 1988; Sui, He, & Humphreys, 2012; Turk, Cunningham, & 
Macrae, 2008; Turk, van Bussel, Waiter, & Macrae, 2011; Turk, van Bussel, Brebner, 
Toma, Krigolson & Handy, 2011). This is exemplified by the ‘self-reference effect’ 
(SRE) on memory, the memorial advantage for material encoded with reference to 
self over information encoded with reference to other people or at a semantic level 
(Rogers, Kuiper, & Kirker, 1977; Symons & Johnson, 1997). In typically-developing 
6 
 
children and adults, the SRE is a remarkably robust effect, with meta-analysis 
confirming that across multiple studies, self-referenced information consistently 
enjoys a memory advantage (Symons & Jonson, 1997). 
Despite the general reliability of SREs, the evidence for whether they arise in 
ASD is somewhat equivocal (for a review please see Lind, 2010). Toichi, Kamio, 
Okada, Sakihama, Youngstrom, Findling, and Yamamoto (2002) used a standard trait 
judgment task in which participants were asked whether they or another individual 
possess a series of character traits. This paradigm generally elicits better memory for 
self-referent traits than other-referent traits. Toichi et al. observed no SRE in high 
functioning adults with ASD (evidenced by the group not showing a self-advantage 
during the self versus semantic level of processing conditions), a pattern the authors 
attributed to a lack of self-conscious awareness. In contrast, based on the same trait 
judgment paradigm, Lombardo, Barnes, Wheelwright and Baron-Cohen (2007) found 
that high functioning participants with ASD (n = 30) did show an SRE when asked to 
judge the number of syllables in a trait adjective or whether a trait applies to 
themselves, a best friend or Harry Potter (fictional character).  All groups (including 
those with ASD) remembered more words learned during the Self condition than any 
other (Self>Best Friend>Harry Potter>Syllable), although the magnitude of the self-
reference effect was smaller in the ASD group. 
Studies involving children with ASD have failed to demonstrate clear self-
referential encoding advantages using the trait judgment task. Henderson et al. (2009) 
asked children (mean age = 12.5 years) to read a list of adjectives, deciding whether 
the adjective either described them (self), described Harry Potter, or was over a 
specified word length (featural). While a control group of neurotypical children and a 
group of learning impaired children showed a clear SRE, the high functioning 
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children with ASD (n = 31) did not.  In a similar vein to Lombardo et al., the ASD 
group showed a depth of processing effect (Harry Potter/Self > Featural) but not a 
self-reference effect (Self=Harry Potter).  In addition, the authors report a negative 
correlation between symptom severity in the ASD group and the SRE, suggesting that 
children with more severe ASD characteristics showed the least SRE. A more recent 
study by Burrows, Usher, Mundy and Henderson (2017) replicated the original 
Henderson et al., paradigm, finding a reduced SRE in the ASD group compared to the 
TD group. These studies tentatively suggest that self-referential encoding biases in 
ASD groups can occur, but may be further complicated by participant group 
characteristics such as ASD severity levels and symptomology. 
An important reason for the lack of both quantity and clarity of data 
concerning the SRE in autism may be that the trait judgment paradigm is ill-suited to 
studying the self-processing system in this population. Trait evaluation requires an 
ability to consider the abstract psychological self, so if there are impairments in 
understanding self or others at this level, this may undermine memory performance. It 
is clear that alternative paradigms must be applied if we are to better comprehend the 
nature of self-construct in ASD, which are not reliant on an abstract understanding of 
self. 
Interestingly, research employing concrete, non-evaluative encoding tasks 
(e.g., linking stimuli to self through ownership) has elicited reliable SREs in both 
adults (e.g., Cunningham, Turk, MacDonald, & Macrae 2008; Gutchess, Sokal, 
Coleman, Gotthilf, Grewal, & Rosa, 2015; Van den Bos, Cunningham, & Turk, 2010) 
and children (Cunningham, Brebner, Quinn & Turk, 2014; Cunningham, Vergunst, 
Macrae & Turk, 2013).  In one ownership study, Cunningham et al. (2008) asked 
participants to sort cards showing pictures of objects into self-owned and other-owned 
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sets on the basis of a color cue (e.g., all cards with a red sticker belong to Participant 
A). Although the ‘ownership’ was clearly temporary, hypothetical and arbitrary in the 
sorting task, even this minimal level of self-association was sufficient to produce a 
robust memory advantage for the self-owned objects. Subsequent work has found 
similar preferential processing for stimuli presented simultaneously with a self-image 
or self-name (Turk et al., 2008), shapes associated with a self-label (Sui et al., 2012), 
and objects acted on by self (Ross et al., 2011). Taken together, these studies suggest 
that the SRE is not dependent on trait evaluation but can be driven by less abstract 
tasks that create an association between the self and external stimuli. 
The usefulness of these non-evaluative paradigms lies in their ability to assess 
self-referential processing biases in the absence of abstract, elaborate, psychological 
self-knowledge that may be impaired in autism. Rather than relying on elaboration 
and organization by the self-knowledge framework (Klein & Loftus, 1988; Klein & 
Kihlstrom, 1986; Symons & Johnston, 1997), low-level responses to self-cues are 
likely to drive the effects, particularly increases in attention to self-relevant stimuli. 
This reasoning is supported by both behavioral and neuroimaging studies, showing 
that cues of self-ownership elicit prioritizing attentional responses that ensure the self-
relevant information is preferentially processed (Bargh, 1982; Gray, Ambady, 
Lowenthal, & Deldin, 2004; Sui, He, & Humphreys, 2012; Turk, Brady-Van den Bos, 
Collard, Gillespie-Smith, Conway, & Cunningham, 2013; Turk, van Bussel, Brebner, 
Toma, Krigolson, & Handy, 2011; Turk, van Bussel, Waiter et al., 2011; Turk, van 
den Bos et al, 2010). 
Developmental research supports the proposal that non-evaluative SRE 
paradigms allow self-referential processing biases to be explored in new populations. 
For example, Cunningham et al. (2013) used the ownership sorting paradigm to 
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explore the SRE in early childhood, a stage at which the trait judgment paradigm is 
developmentally inappropriate. In this study, young children sorted toy-images into 
self-owned and other-owned sets, again based on color cues. A subsequent 
recognition memory test revealed that children aged as young as four years had better 
memory for objects encoded with reference to self. This study suggests that the 
ownership paradigm can offer a platform on which to build an understanding of self-
processing in populations whose SRE performance is subject to mixed findings such 
as ASD.  
One recent study has sought to initiate this line of research. Grisdale, Lind, 
Eacott, and Williams (2014) tested 16 adults with ASD and 16 typically developing 
adults using Cunningham et al.’s (2008) ownership task. They found that there was a 
significant memory advantage for self-owned items in the typically developing group, 
but not in the group with ASD. Additional analysis revealed a negative but non-
significant relationship between the size of the ownership effect and self-reported 
ASD symptom severity (indicated by the Autism Spectrum Quotient – AQ; Baron-
Cohen et al., 2001). Interestingly, in a separate experiment Grisdale et al. found that 
within a typically developing adult sample, the memory advantage for self-owned 
items was significantly correlated with scores on the AQ.  Specifically, participants 
who showed more ASD traits had less of an ownership effect (i.e., a lower SRE). 
Grisdale et al.’s findings suggest that there is scope to use ownership to 
explore self-processing in ASD in more depth, particularly with regards to variation 
within a heterogeneous ASD group. The current study seeks to apply this 
methodology earlier in development to examine the memorial impact of self- and 
other-ownership in groups of children with ASD and two comparison groups (CA 
group: matched for chronological age; VA group: matched for verbal age), and to 
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explore the relationship between ownership biases in memory and socio-
communicative abilities, and autism severity.  
We predict that use of the concrete, non-evaluative ownership paradigm will 
demonstrate an SRE (i.e., memory advantage for self-owned relative to other-owned 
items) across the groups. However, in line with previous research (e.g., Burrows et al., 
2017; Lombardo et al., 2007) we predict that the magnitude of the self-memory 
advantage in the ASD group will be reduced relative to typically developing controls, 
and that it will be associated with levels of ASD characteristics (specifically higher 
levels of ASD symptoms and low levels of socio-communicative ability being 
associated with lower levels of ownership effect). 
 
2. Method 
2.1 Participants 
A total of 66 children participated in the study. This sample comprised 22 
children with a clinical diagnosis as being on the autistic spectrum (ASD group), 22 
typically-developing children individually matched for chronological age (CA group), 
and 22 typically-developing children individually matched for verbal age (VA group; 
see Table 1). Verbal ability was assessed using the British Picture Vocabulary Scale 
(BPVS II; Dunn, Dunn, Whetton, & Burley, 1997).  Non-verbal ability (NVA) was 
assessed by the Raven’s Coloured Progressive Matrices (RCPM; Raven, Raven, & 
Court 1998). T-tests were carried out to check that the ASD group did not differ 
significantly in chronological age compared to the CA group t (42) = .020, p = .984, d 
=.01,  or verbal age compared to the VA group t (42) = .184, p = .855, d =.06.    
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Table 1 here 
 The children with autism were recruited from specialist ASD units attached to 
three mainstream schools and diagnosis was confirmed using medical records prior to 
testing. In addition school teachers identified children with sufficient verbal 
communication to follow task instructions and suitable for inclusion in the study.  To 
assess levels of ASD trait presentation, teachers were asked to complete two 
questionnaires for each participant: the Asperger’s Syndrome Diagnostic Scale 
(ASDS; Myles, Bock & Simpson, 2001) and the Social Communication 
Questionnaire (SCQ; Rutter, Bailey, Berument, Lord & Pickles, 2003). The group 
with ASD showed a wide range of symptom severity (range in ASDS - standardised 
scores from 37 to 128).  14 of the children with autism scored over 80 on the ASDS 
scale which indicates a probability of an Autism Spectrum Disorder, the overall group 
score was (m = 85; SD = 26.4). The Social Communication Questionnaire (SCQ; 
Rutter et al. 2003) showed that the scores ranged from 1 to 17, with 3 children in the 
ASD group obtaining a score over 15 (a score of 15 or over implies the presence of 
ASD) the overall group score was (m = 7; SD = 5.4). This indicates that despite these 
children manifesting high social and communicative abilities (as indicated by the 
SCQ), they still displayed high levels of behaviours and cognitive symptoms 
associated with autism as shown by the ASDS scores.  
2.2 Materials  
The set of picture cards consisted of 84 laminated images of highly familiar  
toys (e.g. Superman, lion, crayons) pictured on a 90mm x 90mm white background. 
Twenty-eight had a 10mm orange border, 28 had a 10mm grey border, and 28 were 
not used in the ownership task but were used as foils in the subsequent recognition 
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task. The toys shown on the cards were divided into three equivalent lists, matched for 
toy type (e.g. cuddly toys, outdoor toys), stereotypic owner gender and syllabic 
length. Three sets of cards were created so that the use of the items as orange-
bordered, grey-bordered and foils for the recognition task could be counterbalanced 
across participants. The order of the cards within each set was randomized (by 
shuffling), but the sets were prearranged to ensure that each child sorted half of the 
cards that went into their basket, and half the cards that went into their partner’s 
basket. 
 
2.3 Procedure 
Testing was carried out in school over two sessions. The ownership task and 
BPVS II were conducted in Session 1 and the RCPM was carried out in Session 2. 
Each child’s classroom teacher was asked to complete the ASDS and SCQ measures 
in their own time. 
For the ownership task children were taken in pairs to a quiet room within the 
school.  Children were always paired with another child based on diagnostic group 
and gender (on one occasion one male and one female from the typical group had to 
‘stand in’ with a new participant however their answers during this second 
participation were not recorded).  In the room they were invited to sit side-by-side 
opposite the experimenter and had two baskets (one orange and one grey) placed in 
front of them.  The children were asked to imagine that they owned the basket directly 
in front of them and any items that were placed inside this basket.   
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Following the procedure used by Cunningham et al. (2013) the children were 
asked to take turns to put the cards into the appropriate basket, by matching the colour 
of a border around the card with the colour of the basket. The experimenter held up 
each card individually at an equal distance from each child, named the pictured toy, 
and handed the card to one of the children to sort. The child then put the card face 
down in the correct basket (either their own or the other child’s). This design ensured 
that the children had to attend to items that went into both baskets, and that children 
encoded all the items in the context of ownership by one referent (i.e., self or other). 
They were asked not to talk during the sorting task.  
Following the completion of the ownership task the experimenter took each 
child to a separate table for a surprise recognition memory test.  To prevent the impact 
of the verbal cue serving as the trigger for recognition and to reduce the ‘yes bias’ (the 
tendency to answer “yes” to yes-no questions; Moriguchi, Okanda & Itakura, 2008) 
all 84 un-bordered picture cards were laid out on a table (28 self-owned, 28 other-
owned and 28 previously unseen). All children were separated (so that they could not 
observe their partner’s performance in the recognition memory task) and individually 
asked to select any cards that they could remember from the sorting task. Children 
were told that they had not seen all of the cards so they needed to be careful in their 
selection. All of the cards that the child selected were given to the experimenter and 
put aside for later manual recording to guarantee that the child was not aware of 
whether they had selected correct or incorrect cards. 
 
3. Results 
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Participants’ proportionate hit rate (corrected for false alarm rate) was used as 
the dependent variable for the initial analysis. False alarm rates were low overall, with 
a mean of 5.95% of foils incorrectly selected during the memory test. 
A mixed ANOVA was carried out with Ownership (Self, Other) as within 
subjects factor and Group membership (ASD, CA, VA) as between subjects factor.  
There was a significant main effect of Ownership on memory performance, F(1,63) = 
25.72, p >.001,  ηp2 = .29, showing that participants across the three groups 
remembered more self-owned items compared to other-owned.  There was no 
significant effect of Group F (2,63) = .232, p = .79, ηp2 = .007, however there was a 
significant interaction between Ownership and Group, F (2, 63) = 4.03, p = .023, ηp2 = 
.113 (see Figure 1).  
Figure 1 here 
Pairwise comparisons of the ownership effect for each group revealed 
significant a simple main effect of ownership for the ASD group t(21)=4.00, p=.001, d 
= .87 for the CA group t(21)=2.157, p=.043, d = .48, and for the VA group 
t(21)=2.306, p=.031, d = .70.  All groups showed higher memory for the self-owned 
items than for the other-owned items (Self; MASD = .537, SDASD = .34; MCA = .533, 
SDCA = .24; MVA = .531, SDVA = .29: Other; MASD = .367, SDASD = .38, MCA = .471, 
SDCA = .27, MVA = .477, SDVA = .24). One-way ANOVAs showed no significant 
difference in either self-owned item memory (F(2,63) = 0.268, p = .766, ηp2  = .008) 
or other-owned item memory (F(2,63) = 0.719, p = .491, ηp2  = .022) across groups. 
To determine the locus of the group by ownership interaction, we carried out a further 
one-way ANOVA using the recognition advantage for self-owned items (i.e., 
proportion of self-owned items minus proportion of other-owned item correctly 
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recognized) as the dependent variable, to explore more closely the difference between 
self- and other-owned item memory.  This analysis revealed a significant effect of 
group F(2,65) = 4.026, p=.023,  ηp2 = .113. Post-hoc tests demonstrated that there was 
a larger self-advantage in the ASD group compared to both the CA (p=.021, d = .45) 
and VA groups (p=.014, d = .47). The CA and VA groups did not differ significantly 
from one another (p=.861, d = .39).  
The unexpected finding that participants in the ASD group had a greater 
memory advantage for self-owned items than the two comparison groups prompted an 
analysis of patterns within the group of participants with ASD. Correlations between 
self-advantage score and the measures of individual difference were calculated.  There 
was a significant negative association between self-advantage score and both 
measures of ASD trait severity (SCQ r = -0.507, p = 0.016; ASDS scores r = -.608, p 
= .003). This suggests that the more autistic traits participants showed, the lower the 
self-advantage, a pattern that replicates previous work (Grisdale et al., 2014) but 
initially seems at odds with the heightened self-advantage of participants in the ASD 
group in the current study. Examination of memory for self-owned and other-owned 
items within the ASD group provides an explanation. As can be seen in Figure 2, 
these data suggest that the ASD group’s high self-owned memory advantage is driven 
by ASD participants with milder symptoms, and increased autistic trait level 
extinguishes the self-owned bias.  
This pattern was examined by dividing ASD participants into mild (N = 11) 
and severe (N = 11) symptoms groups on the basis of an ASDS score median split. 
Comparison of the self-owned and other-owned scores separately showed no reliable 
difference between the mild and severe symptom groups (self-owned items: F(1,20) = 
.718, p = .407, ηp2 = .035; other-owned items: F(1,20) = 1.251, p =.277, ηp2 =.059). 
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However, within-group contrasts did reveal a divergent pattern. The difference 
between memory for self-owned and other-owned items was highly reliable among 
the children with mild ASD symptoms (t(10) = 4.435, p <.001, d = 1.501), but this 
trend did not reach significance in children with severe ASD symptoms (t(10) = 
1.927, p = .083, d = .729). These patterns should be treated cautiously given the low 
numbers in each group, but nonetheless show an interesting correspondence with the 
pattern indicated by the correlations reported above, with milder symptoms being 
associated with a stronger self-reference effect. 
 
Figure 2 here 
 
4. Discussion 
The current study applied an ownership paradigm to assess the effects of self-
processing biases on memory in children with ASD.  Children with ASD showed a 
significant self-bias, recognizing a higher proportion of self-owned than other-owned 
items. Children in the typically developing verbal- and chronological- age-matched 
comparison group also showed this ‘ownership effect’ in memory (Cunningham et al., 
2008). An unexpected finding was that the magnitude of this memory bias was 
actually greater in the ASD group than in the typically-developing comparison 
groups. This increased SRE magnitude was driven by children in the ASD group who 
had lower levels of ASD traits, as there was a significant negative correlation between 
symptom severity and self-bias, and a strong, reliable self-bias only those children in 
the ASD group who had milder symptoms. This complex pattern supports our main 
experimental predictions, but offers some insight into the way in which self-
processing biases might vary in children with different degrees of ASD severity.  
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We predicted that children with ASD would show a significant ownership 
effect because self-associations created through ownership can evoke self-processing 
biases without relying on abstract character knowledge, unlike the standard SRE trait 
evaluation task (Cunningham et al., 2008). We reasoned that previous SRE research 
with children and adults with ASD using this task (Henderson et al., 2009; Toichi et 
al., 2002) may have underestimated the prevalence of SREs because of the inherent 
abstract nature of the trait adjective task. The group-level data support this claim, with 
ownership effects in memory emerging in the ASD group and both comparison 
groups. Indeed, the ASD group actually showed a higher SRE relative to the 
comparison groups. Although this is contrary to previous studies in which SRE has 
been lower in ASD compared to controls (Burrows et al., 2016; Grisdale et al., 2014; 
Henderson et al., 2009), it is consistent with the abundance of ASD research 
suggesting that autistic individuals pay less attention to other people than neurotypical 
comparison groups (Hobson, 1984; Lord, Rutter, & Le Couteur, 1994; Werner, 
Dawson, Osterling, & Dinno, 2000). If there is egocentricity and reduced interest in 
others, and by extension, others’ belongings, then this should increase SREs by 
exacerbating the difference between attention paid to self- and other-referent stimuli.  
The emergence of a strong SRE in a group of children with ASD appears 
inconsistent with the absent self theory (Frith & Happé, 1999; Frith, 2003), in which 
disrupted self-processing is argued to impair the ability to understand other 
perspectives (simulation theory – Goldman, 2006). The group-level data are therefore 
more consistent with the idea that a lack of attention or interest in other people drives 
the social processing impairments associated with ASD (Baron-Cohen, Lombardo, & 
Tager-Flusberg, 2013). However, the sensitivity of the ownership task to self-memory 
bias allowed us to examine individual differences between children who show mild 
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versus severe levels of ASD symptoms. A negative association was found between 
ASD symptom severity (as indicated by the ASDS and the SCQ) and self-memory 
bias. Further, when children in the ASD group were divided into those with mild v. 
severe symptoms, a significant ownership effect only emerged in those with mild 
symptoms. These findings suggest that the high ownership effect in the ASD group as 
a whole is driven by participants with relatively mild symptoms. The more severe the 
level of ASD traits, the lower the self-memory bias. This pattern is more consistent 
with the research which shows an absence (Henderson et al., 2009; Toichi et al., 
2002) or attenuation (Lombardo et al., 2007) of the SRE in people with ASD, and 
with Grisdale et al.’s finding that the magnitude of the SRE decreases with increasing 
socio-communicative difficulties (Grisdale et al., 2014; Henderson et al., 2009). Thus 
we suggest that for individuals who have a high level of ASD traits and low socio-
communicative ability, there may be impaired self-functioning (an absent self).   
In sum, the data patterns suggest that in neurotypical participants, there is a 
priorotisation of self  over others that gives rise to SREs such as the ownership effect, 
but attention can also be diverted to others where appropriate; in mildly autistic 
children, there is likely to be a self bias that is exacerbated because attention tends not 
to be diverted to others; in severely autistic children, there may be no self-bias in the 
first place. An interesting  aspect of the magnitude of SRE in participants with ASD 
(which is tentatively suggested), is that the emphasized ‘self’ and ‘other’ performance 
in those who have less severe ASD may be associated with a lack of attention shifting 
(Rinehart, Bradshaw, Moss & Brereton, 2001; Courchesne, Townsend, & 
Akshoomoff 1994) and cognitive flexibility (for a review see Geurts et al., 2009).  
The impaired ability to consider ‘others’ or ‘another’s perspective’ may be linked to 
an inability to disengage (de Vries & Geurts 2012) from ‘self’.  Further research is 
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therefore required to examine potential links not only between symptom and social 
abilities (such as those in the current paper) but also cognitive profiles (i.e. cognitive 
flexibility).   
The complexity of the relationship that we found between the ownership effect 
and autistic traits casts some light on previous findings concerning the level of self-
reference effect found in ASD samples. In particular, the mixed findings regarding the 
strength of SRE within ASD samples may be a result of varying levels of ASD trait 
severity within the tested groups. The current study suggests that an SRE is more 
likely to be found if a group of ASD-diagnosed participants who showed mild 
symptoms were tested, whereas an SRE would be less likely to emerge in a sample 
consisting of participants with a very high level of ASD traits. This is currently a 
speculative prediction, but we strongly suggest that measures of autistic traits (e.g., 
socio-communicative processing) in future analyses of self-referencing so that the 
incidence of self-processing biases in ASD can be more fully understood. 
The current findings also have methodological implications. They suggest that 
the use of a concrete, object-based measure of self-memory bias can highlight SRE 
abilities and differences in a group with complex needs (see also Cunningham et al., 
2014; Grisdale et al., 2014).  The ownership task requires more concrete self-item 
associations and the results of the current study provide evidence that this task is 
sensitive to self-bias within a group of ASD-diagnosed children evidenced by them 
showing an SRE. Groups of individuals with ASD display varied levels of cognitive 
and verbal abilities, which interact in complex ways (Rice, Moriuchi, Jones, & Klin, 
2012), so the appropriateness of standard paradigms must be a consideration. 
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5. Conclusions 
The current study indicates that children with ASD can show an intact SRE 
when an appropriate paradigm like the ownership task is used. However, this effect is 
dependent on symptom severity: self-bias was reduced in children who showed higher 
levels of ASD traits and low socio-communicative ability, but increased in children 
with lower levels. These findings explain previous mixed findings by suggesting that 
self processing biases are intact in some children with ASD, perhaps as a result of 
very low attention to others, but reduced in others, perhaps due to an ‘absent self’. 
The data are consistent with suggestions that self-processing may be anchored within 
the social difficulties observed at the more severe end of the autistic spectrum. 
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Table 1: Participant details for children with autism and their typically developing comparison groups (standard deviation within parenthesis) 
Group N Gender Ratio 
males:females 
CAi VAii NVAiii 
ASD 22 20:2 12.3 years (3.1) 9.3 years (3.0) 27 (6) 
Chronological age-matched (CA) 
 
22 16:6 12.0 years (3.1) 11.1 years (3.0) 29 (7) 
Verbal ability age-matched (VA) 22 13:9 10.5 years (3.6) 9.5 years (3.3) 25 (6) 
 
i Chronological age provided in years and full months.  Standard deviation provided in full months in parenthesis. 
ii Verbal ability is calculated using the mean raw score from the British Picture Vocabulary Scale standard deviation in parenthesis. 
iii Nonverbal ability is provided as mean scores on the Ravens Coloured Progressive Matrices task (max. score 36) standard deviation in parenthesis. 
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Figure 1:  
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Figure 2: Scatterplot showing the relationship between SCQ scores (Panel A)/ASDS 
scores (Panel B) and the recognition advantage for self-owned items (i.e., proportion 
of self-owned items minus proportion of other-owned item correctly recognized) in the 
ASD group only.  
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